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388 ANNALS OF IOWA
INTERPRETATION OF THE CAPITOL GROUNDS
EXTENSION LAW.
(Concluded.)
III. In so far then as the act authorizes the Issuance of warrants
or certiflcates in anticipation of taxes to be collected during a
biennial period and to cover any deflciency therein to meet ex-
penses incurred in executing its purposes, not exceeding $250,000,
it ought not to be denounced as inimical to the provisions of the
Constitution quoted. If the last four sections of the act were to be
construed as plaintiffs contend these should be, however, a differ-
ent conclusion would necessarily follow. They say that these au-
thorize the executive council to anticipate the taxes to be levied
during the entire ten years amounting in the aggregate to over
$2,200,000, $1,200,000 of which must be collected after the flrst
biennial period. Were it to be so construed, the limit of $250,000
might be exceeded, and unless the principle which governed in
Swanson v. City of Ottumwa, 118 Iowa, 161, 91 N. W. 1048, 59 L.
R. A. 620, shall obtain, this would be in violation of section 2 of
article 7 of the Constitution. There, the city was authorized to
levy a tax annually for a series of years out of which to create
a sinking fund for the purpose of the purchase or erection of a
system of waterworks, and, in order to meet the present cost, to
create a speciflc fund, by issuing bonds payable only from said
sinking fund, from which and the 'sinking fund on hand to pay the
contract price for the erection and completion of said system of
waterworks. For the payment of these bonds with interest "shall
be pledged the entire proceeds of the two mills sinking fund tax,"
"and so much of the proceeds of the water rates and rentals col-
lected from consumers and of the water tax * * * as shall not
be needed for maintenance and operation, repairs and proper and
necessary extensions, additions and improvements of said water-
works." The plan was approved by a vote of the electors, a contract
entered into, and the city was about to Issue bonds such as con-
templated, when suit was instituted to enjoin the issuance of the
bonds for that, as was claimed, the indebtedness of the city then
equalled the constitutional limit and such bonds would create a
debt within the meaning of section 3, art. 11, of the Constitution,
declaring that "no county or other political or municipal corpora-
tion shall be allowed to become indebted in any manner, or for
any purpose, to an amount in tbe aggregate, exceeding five per
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centum on. the value of the taxable property within such county
or corporation." On great consideration, the bonds were held not to
create a "debt" such as contemplated in. the above section; the
court, after an exhaustive review of the authorities, saying: "Were
we to give the word 'debt' the hroad significance that some of the
authorities would justify, we should destroy the corporate life and
efiiciency of every municipality which reached the allowed limit
of indebtedness. But the construction we give it has strong sup-
port in the decisions of the courts of other states, is in strict line
with the opinion we have heretofore frequently expressed, and pre-
serves the integrity of the Constitution according to its evident
meaning and intent, while entailing no disastrous consequences to
the city or to its citizens. The right of a city to construct and
own works of puhlie utility, if such rights exist, is one of great im-
portance, and should not he embarrassed or rendered nugatory hy
strained or technical construction of the Constitution or of the
statutes. Its importance is not so much in the fact that puhlic
ownership is in itself wise or desirable (concerning which there
may be much difference of opinion) as in the fact that with such
power in reserve municipalities are placed in position to deal with
private owners on equal terms, and avoid vexations which their
helplessness might otherwise invite."
That case is readily distinguishable from that now hefore us. After
the bonds were issued and the system of waterworks purchased or
erected, the municipality would have no escape from the levy and
collection of the taxes stipulated and the application thereof to the
satisfaction of the bonds and interest. In this case, however, the
action of one General Assemhly is not binding on its successor un-
less so declared in the fundamental law, and, though the Thirty-
Fifth General Assembly did enact these statutes relating to the ex-
tension of the state capitol grounds, the*^  succeeding General As-
semblies are in no manner inhibited from repealing them. Indeed,
it will be within the power of the next General Assemhly, or any of
its successors, if so disposed, not only to repeal chapter 14 of the
acts of the Thirty-Fifth General Assemhly in its entirety but to dis-
pose of the property acquired thereunder. ît is said that the hold-
ers of the certificates or warrants take that risk, as these are pay-
able only from the taxes provided in the act. But this is so with
every state debt. Though the deht created may constitute a legal
obligation, no remedy exists for its enforcement, unless possibly
held by another state except as the state may permit, and necessari-
ly the holder must rely upon payment at the option of the state
from the only resource available, i. e., taxation. State v. Young,
20 Minn. 474, 9 N. W. 737. Being nonenforceable, such a debt is
akin to a moral obligation, and, though condemned as in violation
of good morals and as against sound public policy, no one has ever
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questioned the power of a state to repudiate its debts. A subse-
quent Legislature might repeal chapter 14, and this would leave the
certificate without a fund from which to be paid; but it is scarcely
conceivable that, after having received the proceeds of the certifi-
cates and made use of its own purposes the state would deem the
denial of any obligation to repay as consistent with the honor and
integrity of a great people. Moreover, section 5 of article 7 of the
Constitution prescribes how a debt exceeding $250,000 shall be creat-
ed and paid: (1) For some single work or object; (2) to be paid
with interest from an annual tax within 20 years; and (3) applied
only thereon. The particular method of creating a fund out of
which the state debt, authorized by a vote of the people, shall be
paid, is precisely like that contemplated in this act and approved
in the Swanson Case. The only possible distinction between the
statutory method of providing for the payment of municipal bonds
and the constitutional method of providing for the payment of a
state debt, voted by a majority of the people, is that, under the
former, the bonds are expressly made payable from the sinking
fund created by the levy and collection of the taxes authorized only
while under the latter the limitation of payment therefrom only is
plainly to be implied. The Constitution having particularly pre-
scribed the manner of raising a revenue out of which a debt ~of the
state shall be satisfied, an obligation for an object such as defined in
the Constitution and to be discharged as therein directed ought not
to be denominated as other than a debt of the state.
Nor do we find the weight of authority otherwise. Section 10 of
article 7 of the Constitution of New York, though differing some,
is in substance like section 2 of article 7, and is in words follow-
ing: "The state may, to meet casual deficits or failures in reve-
nues, or for expenses not provided for, contract debts, but such
debts, direct and contingent, singly or in the aggregate,
shall not at any time, exceed one million of dollars; and the
money arising from the loans creating such debts, shall be ap-
plied to the purpose for which they were obtained, or to repay the
debt so contracted, and to no other purpose whatever." Section 12,
art. 7, Const. 1846 (section 4, art. 7, Const. 1894) is, in all essential
particulars, like section 5 of our article 7, and the Court of Appeals,
in Newell v. People, 7 N. Y. 11, declared an act authorizing the crea-
tion of a fund by the sale of canal revenue certificates for the en-
largement and completion of the Erie, Genesee Valley, and Black
River Canals and the payment of these from revenue to be derived
from taxation during 21 years void as creating a debt in excess of
the limitation contained in the section quoted. . •
Article 12 of the Constitution of North Dakota declares that "the
state may, to meet casual deficits, or failure in revenue, or in case
of extraordinary emergencies, contract debts but such debts shall
never in the aggregate exceed the sum of two hundred thousand
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dollars," with provisions like those contained in sections 4 and 5
of article 7 of our Constitution following. In State v. McMillan, 12
N. D. 280, 96 N. W. 310, the Supreme Court of that state, speaking
through Young, C. J., declared an act of the Legislature authorizing
the issuance of bonds for the construction of school buildings and
payable in the future out of funds derived from the sale of lands set
apart for the schools of a state debt and, as that outstanding
equalled the limit fixed by the Constitution, the act was held to be
in violation thereof; the court following Newell v. People, supra.
Section 5 of article 9 of the Constitution of Minnesota reads: "For
the purpose of defraying ordinary expenditures, the state may con-
tract public debts, but such debts shall never, in the aggregate, ex-
ceed $250,000; every such debt shall be authorized by law, for some
single object, to be distinctly specified therein; and no such law shall
take effect until it shall have been passed by the vote of two thirds of
the members of each branch of the Legislature, to be recorded by
yeas and nays on the journals of each house respectively; and every
such law shall levy a tax annually sufficient to pay the annual in-
terest of such debt, and also a tax sufficient to pay the principal
of such, debt within ten years from the final passage of such law,
and shall specially appropriate the proceeds of such taxes to the
payment of such principal and interest; and such appropriation
and taxes shall not be repealed, postponed or diminished, until the
principal and interest of such debt shall have been wholly paid."
In Brown v. Hingdal, 109 Minn. 6,122 N. W. 469, the Supreme Court
of that state upheld an act authorizing the issuance of interest-bear-
ing certificates of indebtedness, as funds were needed for the con-
struction of a new state prison costing $2,250,000, said certificates
to be payable out of a fund produced by the levy and collection of
taxes amounting to $225,000 per year, following Fleeten v. Lambér-
ton, 69 Minn. 187, 72 N. W. 65, the court saying: "Counsel for
plaintiff differentiates the Lamberton Case by the fact that no cer-
tificates of indebtedness were there authorized to be issued, and
earnestly insists that this feature of the act under consideration
renders it wholly void. We are unable to concur in this claim. The
certificates in and of themselves create no indebtedness against the
state. On the contrary, they are mere evidence of the holder's
right to demand and receive 'from the State Treasurer the proceeds
of the tax authorized by the act to be levied and collected, and
known and classified as the "Prison Building Fund." ' Fairly con-
strued, the act contemplates their payment from this fund ex-
clusively, and they are not general obligations of the state. What-
ever indebtedness, if any, was created by this act, is, within the
Lamberton Case, found in the provisions thereof appropriating
$2,250,000 for the construction of the new prison and the levy of a
tax extending over a period of nine years to produce the same,
and not by the issuance of certificates indebtedness evidencing the
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right of the holders thereof to . the fund when collected. If the
certificates could be construed as creating an indebtedness against
the state payable from the general revenue fund, a different ques-
tion would be presented. But they are not. They are to be issued
In anticipation of funds provided for and appropriated, rightfully
under the Lamberton Case, and are valid only as respects that fund
when paid into the state treasury."
The majority intimate that but for the prior decision a different
conclusion might be reached, but the act considered in the former
case merely appropriated any surplus thereafter in the .state
treasury and the proceeds of an annual levy of two-tenths of a mill
upon the assessed valuation of the state for not exceeding ten years
to the purchase of a site and the erection of a capitol building at a
cost of not exceeding $2,000,000. It in no manner contemplated the
creation of a debt nor authorized the revenues to be anticipated by
the issuance of evidence of debt. It might have been repealed by
any subsequent Legislature, but, of course, was the law of the state
until repealed in authorizing the levy and collection of this like
other taxes. This was pointed out by Lewis, J., in his dissenting
opinion in the Brown Case, adding: "The majority hold that the
Legislature may provide for the present capitalization of such
future conditions by issuing certificates of indebtedness to draw
interest to be sold to the public upon the assurance that the credit
of the state is behind them, and that the money will be forthcom-
ing when the certificates mature. By this arrangement the entire
amount of the tax levy is anticipated, and the amount is available
for present purposes. Thus the evidence of a present indebtedness
is furnished which may be received with confidence in the commer-
cial world."
The opinion in Fleeten v. Lamberton, supra, does not disclose
that the point now being considered was involved, and as the court
in Brown v. Ringdal, supra, gave the question scant, if any, con-
sideration, the latter decision is not persuasive authority. More-
over, in that state a debt in excess of the limit may be authorized
by a two-thirds vote of the members of each House of the General
Assembly, and whether the act for the construction of the prison
was so passed does not appear.
California adopted a Constitution in 1849, article 7 of which pro-
vided that the "Legislature shall not in any manner create any
debt or debts, liability or liabilities, which shall singly, or in the
aggregate, with any previous debts or liabilities exceed the sum of
three hundred thousand dollars." Then follows an exception in case
of war, invasion, or insurrection, similar to section 4 of article 7
of our Constitution, and provisions for the creation of a debt ex-
ceeding that amount like section 5 of that article. In People v.
Pacheco, 27 Cal. 175, the Supreme Court of that state, speaking
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through Sawyer, X, held an act of the Legislature, in substance'
agreeing to pay the interest on $1,500,000 of bonds issued by the
Central Pacific Railway Company for a period of 20 years and direct-
ing that an annual tax of 8 cents on the $1,000 taxable property of
the state for that purpose, any deficiency to be paid from the gen-
eral fund on hand and in consideration thereof, the company under-
took to carry public messages, lunatics and convicts to and from
asylums and prisons, materials for the construction of the state
eapitol, and munitions of war without other compensation. The
preamble indicated it was a war measure and the court upheld ii as
such. But it also declared that, though the state was indebted be-
yond the constitutional limit, the act did create a "debt" within
the meaning of the article a part of which we have quoted. In
doing so, the court, after full consideration, concludes: "Here is a
provision for raising a fund and setting apart and appropriating it
to the payment of the interest on the bonds • in question, more
specific than those in the cases of State v. McCauley, 15 Cal. 429,
McCauley v. Brooks, 16 Cal. 24, and Koppikus v. State Capitol Com-
missioners, 16 Cal. 249, because in those cases the payment was to be
made, generally, out of 'moneys in the treasury not otherwise appro-
priated,' without providing any specific fund and devoting it to tbat
use alone, or knowing whether or not there would in fact be any un-,
appropriated moneys in the treasury at the time payments would fall
due. In this case, a specific fund is provided and set apart, to be de-
voted to the paymentof the interest in question alone; and it would
seem to be more than ample for the purpose, as the tax provided for on
a sum much less than the present assessed valuation of the taxable
property in the state, would produce the required amount, and tbe
appropriation from the general fund will not be required until the
specific fund is exhausted, which may, and in all probability never
will, occur. For these reasons there would be even less propriety
in holding this appropriation to be a debt or liability, within the
meaning of the constitutional restriction, than those which were
the subjects of discussion in the cases cited. The Legislature has
provided a fund, and made an appropriation for the entire amount.
No further legislation is required upon the subject. Nothing fur-
ther remains to be done on the part of the state, but the ministerial
duty of collecting taxes and paying the interest out of the proceeds,
as it from year to year accrues. Of course the state cannot, without
a breach of good faith, refuse through its officers to perform this
ministerial duty."
An examination of the earlier cases relied upon discloses that,
while the contracts entered into extended beyond the time for which
taxes were available, no liability was created in excess of which
would be in the treasury to meet it. No attention was given the
thought that the scheme was like that provided in the article for
the creation of an indebtedness in excess of the amount limited.
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The court appears to have relied largely on State v. Medherry, 7
Ohio St. 526; hut there the decision was that the state might antici-
pate the revenues to he collected within the biennial period for
•which the General Assemhly may authorize the levy and collection
of taxes, and, as a clause in the Constitution forbade appropriations
for more than two years, the act authorizing a contract extending
over a period of five years was denounced as invalid.
For the reasons aiready stated, we are not inclined to follow the
California decisions. To do so would defeat the manifest design
of the peopie in adopting the section of the Constitution in limiting
indehtedness the General Assembly may create. The salutary pur-
pose was to prevent mortgaging the revenues of the state in the
future, heyond a specified amount, and, if this is to he rendered, it
Is quite as essential to denounce a scheme to incur a deht for the
payment of which provision is made hy a scheme of taxation as a
deht to the payment of which no thought has heen given. In either
event, the funds to meet the ohiigation must he raised hy taxation,
and, in either, it is certain to be paid.
The decision in Swanson v. City of Ottumwa, supra, then is not
controlling, and, were the act to be construed as authorizing the
issuance of certificates payahle from taxes levied beyond the bien-
nial period exceeding $250,000, it would have to he denounced as
inimical to section 2 of article 7 of the Constitution.
IV. The last four sections of the act then are valid, if they may
he construed as authorizing the issuance of certificates in anticipa-
tion of taxes to be levied and collected in the hienniai period dur-
ing the period of such issue and for any deficiency beyond that to
meet the expenses incurred in pursuance of the first eight sections
not exceeding $250,000. If, however, the act must he construed as
conferring authority to issue certificates to cover such deficiency
in excess of such amount, the last four sections must he denounced
to he inimicable to the fundamental law. The test, as contended
hy plaintiffs, is not what has been or- may be done under the act,
hut what is authorized to he done in pursuance thereof. As said in
City of Beatrice v. Wright, 72 Neb. 689, 101 N. W. 1039: "The vital
point to he determined is: What is authorized to he done? The
constitutional validity of the law is to he tested, not by what
possibly has heen or may he done under it," but what can "be done
tunder and by virtue of its provisions," and in the light of the Con-
stitution. The memhers of the General Assembly which enacts and
the Governor who approves, a statute have sworn quite as solemnly
to support the Constitution as the members of this court and are to
t e assumed to have intended to conform their conduct with such
•obligation. If then two constructions are open and possihle with-
out doing violence to the language of the act, one upholding the
act as not in violation of the Constitution and the other denouncing
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it as inconsistent therewith, the courts should assume that the
lawmakers intended the former and so construe the language there-
of as to render it harmonious with the fundamental law. This is
in accord with the rule that only when clearly and palpably in
violation of some provision of the Constitution will a statute be
denounced as inimicable thereto.
In McCullough v. Virginia, 172 U. S. 122, 19 Sup. Ct. 138, 43 L. Ed.
382, the principle is well stated: "It is elementary law that every
statute is to be read in the light of the Constitution. However
broad and general its language, it cannot be interpreted as extend-
ing beyond those matters which it was within the constitutional
power of the Legislature to reach. It is the same rule which obtains
in the interpretation of any private contract between individuals.
That, whatever may be its words, it is always to be considered in
the light of the statute, of the law then in force, of the circum-
stances and conditions of the parties. So, although general lan-
guage was introduced into the statute of 1871, it is not to be read as
reaching to matters in respect to which the Legislature had no con-
stitutional power, but ctnly as to those matters within its control
and if there were, as it seems there were, certain special taxes and
dues which under the existing provisions of the state Constitution
could not be affected by legislative action, the statute is to be read
as though it in terms excluded them from its operation."
Again, in Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Kentucky, 179 U. S. 388,
394, 21 Sup. Ct. 103, 45 L. Ed. 244: "Indeed, we are by no means
satisfied that the Court of Appeals did not give the correct con-
struction to this statute in limiting its operations to domestic com-
merce. It is scarcely courteous to impute to a Legislature the enact-
ment of a law which it knew to be unconstitutional, and if it were
settled that a separate coach law was unconstitutional, as applied
to interstate commerce, the law applying on its face to all passen-
gers should be limited to such as the Legislature were competent
to deal with. The Court of Appeals has found such to be the in-
tention of the General Assembly in this case, or, at least, that if
such were not its intention, the law may be supported as applying '
alone to domestic commerce. In thus holding the act to be sever-
able, it is laying down a principle of construction from which there
is no appeal."
Reverting to the terms of the act, it will be noted that, from the
capitol grounds and extension fund, ' the executive council may
purchase the lands included in the plat "from time to time, with-
in said period" (section 2) "on option or contracts or any other
way which said council may deem expedient * * * at any time
within said period of ten years" (section 4). When the several
tracts are to be acquired for the state is entirely within the dis-
cretion of the executive council. "For the purpose of accom-
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plishing the earliest possible completion of the work contem-
plated herein and the carrying out the plan provided for in this
act, the executive council may anticipate the collection of the taxes
here authorized," * * * may issue interest-bearing. warrants or
certificates" payable from the contemplated fund "each running not
more than ten years." Section 9. The executive council may but is
not bound to complete the work at the earliest moment. It may
but is not bound to issue certificates. If it so elects, the
entire ten years may be taken within which to acquire the
land. Even if it should elect to purchase all of that
included in the plat, not owned by the state, immediately the evi-
dence is without dispute, that this can be accomplished from the
funds available from the taxes to be levied and collected for the
years 1913 and 1914 together with the proceeds of certificates not
exceeding $250,000 in amount. Surely then the act ought not to
be construed as authorizing the creation of a "debt" in excess of
the limitation contained in section 2 of article 7 of the Constitu-
tion. Even if this would not suflice, it is not to be assumed that
the executive council would issue certificates exceeding such limit.
Every act of the General Assembly is to be read in the light
of the Constitution, and the limitations contained therein are
as effective as though written into the legislative act. The judici-
ary is not the only department of government upon which the duty
of observing and obeying the provisions of the Constitution de-
volves. Each of the other departments, legislative and executive,
are under precisely the same obligation to know these and obey,
and it ought not to be said that such obligation rests more light-
ly on the one than on the other. All are representatives of the
people with different functions to perform, and though the courts
are by the Constitution itself made the final arbitrators, in con-
struing its terms and interpreting its meaning, it is never to
be lost sight of that, until the contrary appears beyond reasonable
doubt, the courts will proceed on the theory that the legislative
and executive departments have obeyed its commands and will
yield to its injunctions. With the wisdom or expediency of legis-
lation, the courts as such have no concern. Their duty is to con-
strue, apply, and interpret the law, not to enact it, and in so do-
ing we conclude that, when construed in connection with the provi-
sions of the Constitution, the act under consideration cannot be
said to authorize the executive council to violate any of its pro-
visions, and, in our opinion, the district court erred in construing
any portion of the act as unconstitutional.
Reversed. All the Judges concur.

